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INTRODUCTION
There is a new National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in town, dominated by
the appointments and philosophies of the current Administration.' This NLRB has
proceeded with alacrity to respond to its perceived constituency. (Indeed, NLRB
precedents have become like a "restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train
only.", 2) The Board revisions are alternately attacked by union representatives for
"malevolence," 3 defended by management representatives as a "return to sanity," 4
and described by at least one Board member as merely a re-creation of earlier
"normalcy." 5 This Article reviews and analyzes the more significant decisions
issued by the NLRB thus far and their impact upon national labor policy.
EMPLOYER NEUTRALITY
Section 76 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 7 guaran-
tees to employees the rights to organize and join unions, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 8 Section 8(a)(2)
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with, or
contribute financial or other support to, a labor organization.
9
Under the Board's battered' ° but until recently still viable Midwest Piping"
doctrine, an employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act 12 by recognizing or
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A., Antioch College, 1955; LL.B., University
of Wisconsin, 1960. Portions of the article had their origins in L. MODJESKA, NLRB PRAcrtcE (1983), and Modjeska,
Commentaries on the National Labor Relations Board: 1977, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1978).
1. No criticism or value judgment is suggested thereby.
2. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Such fickleness is not a new phenom-
enon at the Board. See, e.g., Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 78
(1962).
3. AFL-CIO Views on NLRB Actions, [News and Background Information] 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 46 (May
21, 1984).
4. Rulemaking asAid in NLRB Polic Reversals. [News and Background Information] 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
142 (June 25, 1984) (Remarks of Peter Nash, Esq.).
5. Defense of NLRB Rulings, [News and Background Information] 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 3 (May 7, 1984)
(Remarks of Member Dennis).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
8. Id. § 158(a)(1).
9. Id. § 158(a)(2).
10. See Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977), and cases cited therein.
II. Midwest Piping & Supply Co.. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). See generaly Getman, The Midwest Piping Doc-
trine: An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogmna. 31 U. Cmt. L. REv. 292 (1964).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I)-42) (1982).
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bargaining with one of two competing unions in the face of rival or conflicting claims
that raised a real question concerning representation. 13 In the Board's view, by such
conduct the employer not only unlawfully arrogated to itself the Board's representa-
tion determination function, but also breached the employer's obligation of
neutrality. 
14
Under the Midwest Piping doctrine an employer faced with a real question
concerning representation could not bargain with the incumbent or any other union
until the Board resolved the representation question. 15 To preclude undue advantage
for the rival union, however, the incumbent union was permitted to continue
administering its contract or processing grievances through its stewards.16 The condi-
tion precedent to establishment of a real question concerning representation was that
the rival union claim "not be clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance."' 17 The
Board found that a real question concerning representation was established, for ex-
ample, when the rival union filed an election petition supported by an administrative
showing of interest. 18 A so-called "bare" or "naked" claim was deemed in-
sufficient. 19 Many courts disagreed with the Board's application, though not the
general theory, of the Midwest Piping doctrine,20 particularly when a clear majority
of employees desired the recognized union. 2 '
The Board recently modified and redefined the Midwest Piping doctrine.22
When an incumbent union is challenged by an outside union, the mere filing of a
representation petition by an outside, challenging union will not require or permit the
13. See Robert Hall Gentilly Rd. Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 692 (1973); Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd. (Kona Surf Hotel).
201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975);
Playskool, Inc., A Div. of Milton Bradley Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir.
1973).
14. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070-71 (1945). In Midvest Piping the Board found that by
executing a union shop contract with one of two rival unions while a representation proceeding was pending before the
Board, the employer indicated its approval of the favored union, accorded it unwarranted prestige, encouraged member-
ship therein, discouraged membership in the rival, and thereby rendered unlawful assistance to the favorite, which
interfered with, restrained, and coerced the employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Id. at 1071.
15. Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958).
16. Id.
17. Playskool, Inc., A Div. of Milton Bradley Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 560, 560 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d
66 (7th Cir. 1973).
18. E.g., Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd. (Kona Surf Hotel), 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Connie Jean, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1967); Swift & Co., 128
N.L.R.B. 732 (1960), enforcement denied, 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961). See generally I THE DEvELOPING LABOR LAw
290-91 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
19. See Robert Hall Gentilly Rd. Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 692 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977), and cases cited therein; American Can
Co. v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976).
21. See, e.g., NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 339 F.2d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1964):
To recognize one of two competing unions while the employees' choice between them is demonstrably in doubt,
is an unfair labor practice under what the courts have accepted as the normal and proper application of the
Midwest Piping doctrine.... And in principle the same result follows when majority support for the recog-
nized union exists, but has been achieved by coercion or some other unfair labor practice.... But where a clear
majority of the employees, without subjection to coercion or other unlawful influence, have made manifest their
desire to be represented by a particular union, there is no factual basis for a contention that the employer's action
thereafter in recognizing the union or contracting with it is an interference with their freedom of choice.
See NLRB v. Riviera Manor Nursing Home, 539 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1976).
22. See RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982); Abraham Grossman (Bruckner Nursing Home), 262
N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
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employer to withdraw from bargaining or executing a contract with the incumbent
union. 23 Accordingly, the employer will not violate section 8(a)(2) by post-petition
negotiations or execution of a contract with the incumbent union.24 The employer
will, however, violate section 8(a)(5)' 5 by withdrawing from bargaining simply
because an outside union has filed a petition. 26 The incumbent union is not thereby
insulated from legitimate outside challenge, and if an election is held, will be put to
the test of demonstrating its continued majority status as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. During the interim between the filing of a valid petition and the election,
however, the incumbent may continue to exercise its full bargaining rights and
powers by virtue of its previously established representative status. If the incumbent
prevails in the election any executed contract is valid and binding; if the challenger
prevails the incumbent's contract is null and void.
The Board also modified the Midwest Piping doctrine as it applies to the initial
organizing efforts of rival unions. The Board announced that it will not find section
8(a)(2) violations in rival union, initial organizing situations in which the employer,
before a valid election petition has been filed, recognizes a union that represents an
uncoerced, unassisted majority. 27 Once notified of a valid petition, however, the
employer may not recognize any of the rival unions. Filing a valid petition thus
becomes the operative event for imposing strict employer neutrality in rival union,
initial organizing situations. Absent a valid petition with its requisite thirty percent
showing of employee interest,2 8 one of several rival unions cannot preclude employer
recognition of a majority union.
There are positive aspects to the foregoing changes. In the rival union situation,
the establishment of a clearly defined rule promotes both industrial stability and
employee free choice. A rival union with minimal support cannot forestall the es-
tablishment of a collective bargaining relationship between the employer and the
majority choice. Further, the employer need not guess whether or not a real question
concerning representation exists.
In the incumbent union situation, the new "business as usual" approach furthers
the statutory policy of stability in labor relations. The new approach also furthers the
statutory policy of employee free choice, by avoiding a distorted election choice
23. RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963, 965 (1982).
24. See Lutheran Hosp. of Md., 265 N.L.R.B. 1198 (1982); Dresser Indus., 264 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982); see also
Richmond Waterfront Terminals, 265 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1982) (execution of new contract with incumbent not election
interference).
25. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the lawful
representative of its employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
26. As before, good faith withdrawal of recognition based upon objective considerations is not precluded. See
Bartenders, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974); Terrell Mach. Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480-81 (1960), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
27. Abraham Grossman (Bruckner Nursing Home), 262 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982). Recognition ofa minority union
would still violate section 8(a)(2). See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bemhard-Altmann Texas
Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961), in which the court held that employer recognition of a minority union as exclusive
bargaining representative violates section 8(a)(l) and (2), notwithstanding any good faith belief in majority status, and that
the union thereby also violates section 8(b)(l)(A) by entering into such agreement.
28. A certification petition filed by a union that is not a party to an existing or recently expired contract must include
a showing of interest and support by at least 30% of the employees in an appropriate unit. NLRB Statements of Procedure,
Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1983).
98 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:95
between an incumbent union artificially denied the attributes of its office and a rival
union artificially placed on an equal footing with the incumbent.
There is the risk, however, that tolerance of incumbent union new contract
negotiations and execution during the preelection period will suggest election futility
to rank and file employees unschooled in the refinements of labor law. The powerful
message received by employees may be that even the federal government cannot
upset vested, established relationships. Employees are most likely to receive this
message when the new contract contains a union security clause requiring member-
ship in and payment of dues to the incumbent union. Sophisticated principles of
contractual defeasance are alien to the shop floor, particularly when the contract on
its face purports to be effective and binding for up to three years.2 9 Thus, the resultant
election choice may be distorted in favor of the incumbent union.
ELECTION PROPAGANDA
During a preelection period, the employer and the union generally are free to
campaign vigorously for employee support, and to express their views on labor
policies and problems. 30 Particular expressions or conduct, however, may constitute
unfair labor practices and/or grounds for setting aside an election.
3 1
Under its long-standing Hollywood Ceramics Co.32 rule, 33 the Board set aside
representation elections because of misleading campaign statements in particular
circumstances. Under Hollywood Ceramics the Board viewed its function as one of
limited intervention in elections, and sought to maintain laboratory conditions and
strike a balance between employees' rights to an untrammeled choice and the parties'
29. Contracts of a definite duration for terms up to three years bar an election for their entire period, and contracts for
longer fixed terms bar an election for the first three years of their terms. See Malco Theatres, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 81
(1976); General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
30. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469
(1941). See generally J. GErMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECrlONS: LAW AND REALTrry
(1976) [hereinafter cited as UNION REPRESENTATION ELECrIONS[; R. WLLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULA-
TION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1974); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964).
3 1. Whether or not an expression constitutes an unfair labor practice depends upon the presence of threats of reprisal
or force or promises of benefit. Section 8(c) of the Act provides that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this [Act], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982); see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1967); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829
(7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
Section 8(c) applies only to unfair labor practice proceedings, however, not representation proceedings, and does not
restrict the Board's power to invalidate elections when expression interferes with employee free choice, irrespective of
threats or promises. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952). Accordingly, the Board reviews the propriety of election campaign conduct and sets
aside the election results and directs a new election when conduct interferes with employee free choice. The Board seeks
to maintain laboratory conditions in election proceedings and to strike a balance between the employees' rights to an
untrammeled choice and the parties' rights to wage a free and vigorous campaign. Id.; see Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962).
32. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
33. The progenitor of Hollywood Ceramics was Gummed Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955). See generally
Bok, supra note 30; Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv.
243 (1963).
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rights to wage a free and vigorous campaign. The Board devised the following
formula in Hollywood Ceramics for striking this balance:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where there has been a misrepresenta-
tion or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the
truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply,
so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to
have a significant impact on the election.
34
In Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.35 the Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics
and held that the Board would no longer set aside representation elections because of
misleading campaign statements. 36 The Board found that application of the Holly-
wood Ceramics rule had produced unsatisfactory results, and that the rule had im-
peded the attainment of employee free choice and produced a host of ill effects.
Included among these ill effects were extensive analysis of campaign literature,
curtailment of free speech, differing application of the rule by the Board and review-
ing courts, increased litigation, and a resultant decrease in the finality of election
results.
The Board noted that much of the difficulty lay in the vagueness and flexibility
of the Hollywood Ceramics rule, as well as in a variety of dubious assumptions
concerning the needs of employees for Board protection against campaign mis-
representation.37 The Board said it would no longer view employees as "naive and
unworldly [individuals] whose decision on as critical an issue as union representation
is easily altered by the self-serving campaign claims of the parties," but rather would
view employees as "mature individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign
propaganda for what it is and discounting it."
38
In General Knit of California, Inc.3 9 the Board reversed itself again, overruled
Shopping Kart, and reinstated the Hollywood Ceramics standard. In Midland Nation-
34. 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
35. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
36. Id. at 1313.
37. Id. at 1312-13. The Board recognized the validity of such critical analyses as Bok, supra note 30, and Getman &
Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical
Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REv. 263 (1976). The full study by Professors Getman, Goldberg & Herman of the effect of
preelection campaigns upon employee predispositions in voting was published in UNiON REPmssErAoN ELECTIONS,
supra note 30.
38. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313 (1977). The Board concluded that while the Act's purpose would best be served by
the demise of the Hollnvood Ceramics rule, the Board would continue to intervene when a party engages in deceptive
campaign practices by improperly involving the Board and its processes, or by using forged documents. Id.; see, e.g.,
Formco, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 61, 62 (1977); Silco, Inc., Atlas Div., 231 N.L.R.B. 110, 110 (1977), and cases cited
therein; J. Ray McDermott & Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 570, 570 (1974); Cascade Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 n.2 (1973);
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 824, 827-30 (1957); United Aircraft Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div.,
103 N.L.R.B. 102, 105 (1953). But see Fabricut, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1196 (1977).
Thus, the Board said that although it will not set an election aside because of the substance of a representation, it will
set an election aside when the representation is made in a deceptive manner. The Board explained as follows:
The essential difference lies in the fact that, while employees are able to evaluate mere propaganda claims, there
is simply no way any person could recognize a forged document "for what it is" from its face since, by
definition, it has been altered to appear to be that which it is not.
228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1314 (1977). The Board also said that it will continue to review the propriety of other campaign
conduct, apart from misrepresentations, which interferes with employee free choice. The foregoing aspects of Board
doctrine discussed in this footnote have remained generally unchanged. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B.
127 (1982); Resorts Int'l, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1982); Affiliated Midwest Hosp., Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1982).
39. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
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al Life Insurance Co.4 0 the Board reversed itself yet again, overruled General Knit,
and reinstated the Shopping Kart standard. "[W]e will no longer probe into the truth
or falsity of the parties' campaign statements, and ... we will not set elections aside
on the basis of misleading campaign statements.",
4 1
The union in Shopping Kart and the employer in Midland made substantial
misrepresentations.4' Still, the Board found that the employees could evaluate the
statements for what they were and thereafter exercise free choice. Constitutional
notions of free speech and respected, empirical studies regarding the realities of
election campaigns certainly support the Board's current position.43
Notwithstanding the respected, empirical studies to the contrary, however,
twenty-five years of labor law practice, including substantial involvement in preelec-
tion campaigns, leave me most suspicious of the proposition.44 My experience sug-
gests that employees do not ignore, cannot evaluate, and are substantially affected by
campaign representations, especially those made by their employer. 45 My fear there-
fore is that deregulation of campaign misrepresentation translates pro tanto into
diminution of true employee free choice.
DEFERRAL TO ARBrrRATION
Sections 9 and 10 of the Act46 grant the Board jurisdiction over unfair labor
practice and representation matters whether or not such matters also involve breaches
of collective bargaining agreements. 47 On the other hand, national labor policy also
encourages and supports the private arbitration of disputes arising under labor con-
tracts.4a Balancing these policies, the Board over the years generally has declined to
40. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
41. Id. at 133.
42. In Shopping Kart the union told employees that the employer's profits during the preceding year were $500,000,
whereas the profits were actually about $50,000. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1311 (1977). In Midland the employer falsely told
employees that the union was composed of highly paid officials who were inept bargainers who had caused violent,
disastrous strikes elsewhere. 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 128 (1982).
43. See Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4, 10
(1984).
44. See generally Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HRv. L. Rv. 1769 (1983).
45. Judge Hays once observed as follows:
The majority opinion demonstrates once more the inescapable truth that United States Circuit Judges safely
ensconced in their chambers do not feel threatened by what employers tell their employees. An employer can
dress up his threats in the language of prediction ("You will l9se your job" rather than "I will fire you") and
fool judges. He doesn't fool his employees; they know perfectly clearly what he means.
NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1967) (Hays, J., dissenting); see also Judge Learned Hand's statement
in NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941):
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the
meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which
they are used, of which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important part. What
to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the
manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-160 (1982).
47. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elee. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962); see also NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
Section 10(a) provides that the Board's power "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
48. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Carey v. Westinghouse Elee. Corp., 375 U.S.
261 (1964); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
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exercise jurisdiction concerning unfair labor practices4 9 and representation
questions50 which had been or could have been submitted to arbitration under the
contract.
Concerning pre-arbitral deferral, the Board held in Collyer Insulated Wire51 that
it would withhold its processes until the parties had first submitted the matter to the
contractual arbitration procedure. 52 In General American Transportation Corp. 5
3
however, the Board held that Collyer pre-arbitral deferral was not appropriate in
cases of employer discrimination, interference with protected rights, or union
coercion 54 (i.e., cases involving sections 8(a)(1) and (3), 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)), while
in Roy Robinson Chevrolet55 the Board held that deferral was appropriate in refusal to
bargain cases56 (i.e., cases involving sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)).
In United Technologies Corp.57 the Board overruled General American Trans-
portation and held that it would defer to the contractual grievance-arbitration machin-
ery in cases involving employer discrimination, interference with protected rights, or
union coercion, as well as in cases involving refusal to bargain. 58 The Board thereby
reaffirmed the blanket pre-arbitration deferral policy under Collyer.
Concerning post-arbitration deferral, the Board's general policy under Spielberg
Manufacturing Co. 59 has been to dismiss unfair labor practice or representation
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Section 203(d) of the Act provides that "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
49. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Hercules
Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962); United Tel. Co. & United Utils., Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954); Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
Siltcoos Div., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943). See generally Alleyne,
Arbitrators and the NLRB: The Nature of the Deferral Beast, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 587 (1981); Covington, Arbitrators and
the Board: A Revised Relationship, 57 N.C.L. REv. 91 (1978); Getman. Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced
Modest.' 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Nash, Wilder & Banov, The Development of the Collyer Deferral Doctrine, 27 VAND.
L. REv. 23 (1974); Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section 8(a)(5), 50 Tex. L. REv. 225 (1972);
Zimmer. Wired for Collyer Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 IND. L.J. 141 (1973).
50. See Raley's Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963).
51, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
52. Id. at 839. The general prerequisites for pre-arbitral deferral under Collyer have been that the dispute arise within
the confines of a stable labor-management relationship, that both parties are willing to arbitrate, and that a contract
interpretation issue lies at the center of the dispute. See generally I THE DEVELOPINO LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at
937-56.
53. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
54. Id. at 808.
55. 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
56. Id. at 829.
57. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 115 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1984).
58. Id. at 1051. The Board stated:
It is fundamental to the concept of collective bargaining that the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement are
bound by the terms of their contract. Where an employer and a union have voluntarily elected to create dispute
resolution machinery culminating in final and binding arbitration, it is contrary to the basic principles of the Act
for the Board to jump into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their disputes through that
machinery. For dispute resolution under the grievance-arbitration process is as much a pars of collective
bargaining as the act of negotiating the contract. In our view, the statutory purpose of encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining is ill-served by permitting the parties to ignore their agreement and to
petition this Board in the first instance for remedial relief.
59. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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matters if the issues have been previously resolved by an arbitration decision.6' The
general prerequisites for post-arbitral deferral under Spielberg have been that the
issues under the Act must have been presented and considered at the arbitration, the
proceedings must have been fair and regular, the proceedings must have been final
and binding on all affected parties, and the award must not be repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.6 '
In the recent Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., Division of Propoco,
Inc.,62 and Suburban Motor Freight, Inc. 63 decisions, the Board held that it would
not honor an arbitration decision unless the unfair labor practice issue involved was
both presented to and considered by the arbitrator. 64 Subsequently, in Olin Corp.65
the Board overruled Propoco and Suburban Motor Freight, and held that in applying
the Spielberg standards for post-arbitration deferral, the Board would find that an
arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor practice issue if (1) the con-
tractual and unfair labor practice issues are factually parallel, and (2) the arbitrator
was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice
issue. 6 6 Any differences between the contractual and statutory standards of review
would be weighed in determining whether the award is "clearly repugnant" to the
Act. The award need not be totally consistent with NLRB precedent to warrant
deference. "Unless the award is 'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's deci-
sion is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer. '67
Further, under Olin the party seeking to avoid deferral must affirmatively demon-
strate the defects in the arbitral process or award. Absent a showing of these requisite
deficiencies, the Board will not subject the case to de novo review.
The resultant wholesale deferral to arbitration effected by current Board policy
raises serious questions concerning congressional intention and delegation of power.
Section 10(a) clearly states that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices
"shall not be affected" by other methods of adjustment established by agreement or
law, and provides that the Board is empowered to cede jurisdiction only to state or
territorial agencies in particular disputes, provided the result is not inconsistent with
the Act.68 Section 14(c)(1) specifically limits Board declination of jurisdiction for
60. The Board has held that post-arbitral deferral under Spielberg is not appropriate in cases of alleged violations of
section 8(a)(4), which proscribes discrimination for filing charges or giving testimony under the Act, because such matters
are strictly within the Board's province. See Filmation Assocs., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721 (1977).
61. See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 18, at 957-84.
62. 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
63. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
64. 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 137 (1982); 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146-47 (1980).
65. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1984).
66. Id. at 1058.
67. Id. (footnote omitted).
68. Section 10(a) provides as follows:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise:
Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such
agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and
transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor
disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determina-
tion of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or has
received a construction inconsistent therewith.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
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lack of interstate commerce impact, and provides that the Board may not decline
jurisdiction over any labor disputes subject to Board jurisdictional standards prevail-
ing as of August 1, 1959.69 Section 3(b) provides that the Board may delegate its
powers to three or more members, and may delegate certain representational de-
termination powers to its regional directors.7 ° Under section 10(b) the Board may
designate examiners (administrative law judges) to preside at formal unfair labor
practice hearings, 7 1 and under section 10(c) the examiner's decision becomes the
final order of the Board, 72 absent timely exceptions.
Nothing in the foregoing statutory provisions or underlying policies suggests
that the Board may abdicate or delegate its powers and duties to private arbitrators, or
that Congress intended any such discretionary abandonment of responsibility. To the
contrary, the precise statutory delineation of permissive delegation strongly suggests
that Congress intended no such deferral. This view is buttressed by the validated
proposition that private arbitrators are inexpert at interpretation, application, and
enforcement of public (statutory) rights. 73 Distinct aspects of national labor policy are
implicated and effectuated by the respective functions of the arbitrator and the Board:
private contractual rights and obligations by the arbitrator, 74 public rights and obliga-
tions by the Board. 75 Contractual and statutory rights have legally independent ori-
gins and arguably should be equally available to the aggrieved employee.
69. Section 14(c)(1) provides as follows:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the subchapter II
of chapter 5 of title 5, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert
jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon
August 1, 1959.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(l) (1982).
70. Id. § 153(b).
71. Id. § 160(b).
72. Id. § 160(c).
73. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1803 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
74. The mission of the arbitration tribunal is to interpret and give content to the collective bargaining agreement as
part of a private system of self-government. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960). See generally Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959); Shulman, Reason.
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999 (1955). The "therapeutic values" (United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)) of the arbitral process are heavily reliant upon the arbitrator's knowledge
of the "industrial common law" (United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960)),
that is, the practices of the industry and shop. "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in
his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
which are not expressed in the contract as criteria forjudgment." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974). The essential task of the
arbitrator is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation, and an award is
invalid and unenforceable if based upon the arbitrator's views of public law instead of the contract. See id. at 56-57;
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981). As stated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 53 (1974):
As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority
is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance with the
"industrial common law of the shop" and the various needs and desires of the parties. The arbitrator, however,
has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties .... If an
arbitral decision is based "solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation," rather
than on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has "exceeded the scope of the
submission," and the award will not be enforced.
See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
75. The institutional role of the Board is quite distinct from that of the arbitrator. The primary responsibility of the
Board is the resolution of statutory issues. The Board performs two distinct functions under the Act, the prevention and
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Notwithstanding the vigor of the foregoing statutory arguments, the correlative
statutory argument that national labor policy favors the private resolution of labor
disputes through arbitration is equally compelling. Congressional preference for a
grievance arbitration system of industrial self-government has been made abundantly
clear over the years, and the Board could hardly ignore the reality that a substantial
arbitral infrastructure is firmly embedded in the labor relations milieu. The very
prevalence and acceptability of arbitration militates against creation of parallel, over-
lapping, and duplicative remedial structures. A concurrent system would be virtually
unworkable and costly as well as wasteful and burdensome beyond tolerance.
The deferral system contemplated by the Board, however, need not entail a
wholesale abdication of statutory authority or responsibility. Board power remains
paramount, and careful application of the Spielberg due process standards can ensure
the vindication of public rights embodied in the statute.
EXCLUSION OF SUPERVISORS
Under the original NLRA the Board held, with Supreme Court approval, not
only that supervisors were included under the protections of sections 7 and 8(a)(1)
and (3), but also that supervisors had bargaining rights under section 9.76 In the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments Congress rejected the Board's policy of giving supervisors
employee status under the Act, and provided in section 2(3) that "employee" does
not include "any individual employed as a supervisor." 77 As stated by Justice
Harlan:
When in 1947 the National Labor Relations Act was amended to exclude supervisory
workers from the critical definition of "employees," § 2(3), it followed that many
remedying of unfair labor practices, and the determination of questions concerning employee representation. See Amalga-
mated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 264-69 (1940); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 405-06
(1940); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 24 (1937). These functions are essentially adjudicative, in
which the Board protects and enforces public, not private, rights in giving effect to the national labor policy embodied in
the Act. See Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-93 (1941); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S.
350, 362-64 (1940); Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940). The legitimacy of
Board determinations is dependent upon their conformity to statutory policy. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
"The Board's remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act
itself." H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (footnote omitted). The specialized competence of the Board
relates to the law of the land, not the law of the shop. It is the Board and not the arbitrator "on which Congress conferred
the authority to develop and apply fundamental national labor policy." Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
500-01 (1978). The Board and not the arbitrator "is expert in federal national labor relations policy." Id.; see Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798-800 (1945).
76. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Vesta-Shannopin Coal
Div., 66 N.L.R.B. 386 (1946). In Packard Motor Car, the Court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the Act which indicates that Congress intended to deny its benefits to foremen as
employees, if they choose to believe that their interests as employees would be better served by organization
than by individual competition. ...
There is no more reason to conclude that the law prohibits foremen as a class from constituting an
appropriate bargaining unit than there is for concluding that they are not within the Act at all.
330 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1947).
77. Section 2(3) provides in part that "[tihe term 'employee' shall include any employee.., but shall not in-
clude ... any individual employed as a supervisor .... 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). The term "supervisor" is defined
in section 2(11) (Id. § 152(11)). Section 14(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act preserved the right of supervisors to become union
members, but also made clear that supervisors were not to be regarded as employees. Section 14(a) provides:
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provisions of the Act employing that pivotal term would cease to operate where super-
visors were the focus of concern. Most obviously, § 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory
employees the rights to engage in self-organization, collective bargaining, and other
concerted activities under the umbrella of § 8 of the Act .... 78
Accordingly, subsequent to the 1947 Amendments it has been held generally
that an employer does not violate sections 8(a)(1) or (3) by discharging or disciplining
a supervisor for engaging in union activity.
79
Notwithstanding the general exclusion of supervisors from the protection of the
Act, the Board held over the years that discharge of a supervisor might violate section
8(a)(1) when the discharge actually interfered with the protected section 7 rights of
statutory employees. 80 Thus, supervisory discharges for giving testimony adverse to
the employer's interest in NLRB or grievance hearings, for refusing to commit unfair
labor practices, or for failing to prevent unionization, were held unlawful.8 1 The
statutory protection thus accorded supervisors stemmed from the need to vindicate
employees' section 7 rights.
In addition, supervisory discharges for engaging in union activity or participat-
ing in concerted activity were found unlawful when the discharge formed an integral
part of the employer's unlawful pattern of conduct designed to discourage employees
from seeking enforcement of contractual rights or otherwise engaging in concerted
activity.
82
In Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc.83 the Board erased this latter exception and held
that termination of supervisors for their own union or concerted activity was not
unlawful, whether they engaged in such activity by themselves or in alliance with
rank-and-file employees. 84 Discharge or discipline of supervisors was held lawful
even when it formed an essential part of an employer's unlawful pattern of conduct
designed to discourage employees from seeking enforcement of contractual rights or
otherwise engaging in concerted activity.85 The "integral part" or "pattern of con-
duct" cases, said the Board, ignored the fact that only employees are protected
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of
a labor organization, but no employer subject to this [Act] shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein
as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
Id. § 164(a); see NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949).
78. Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, MEBA, 382 U.S. 181, 188 (1965) (footnote omitted). See generally American
Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, Inc., 437 U.S. 411 (1978); Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417
U.S. 790 (1974); Beasley v. Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974);
MEBA v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962).
79. See, e.g., NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1951). cert. denied, 342 U.S. 908
(1952). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPINO LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 131-33; 2 Id. at 1456-57.
80. See Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 403-04 (1982), and cases cited therein.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 262 N.L.R.B. 402 (1982).
84. Id. at 404. See generally Bethel, The NLRB and the Discharge of Supervisors: Parker-Robb Brings Questionable
Reform, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1982).
85. See Wer-Coy Fabrication Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 115 L.R.R.M. 1124 (1984).
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against discharge for engaging in union or concerted activity, and that supervisors are
unprotected whether acting alone or with statutory employees. 86
The Board's doctrinal refinement appears to accord with the clear congressional
intention to exclude supervisors as such from the self-organizational, collective
bargaining, and other concerted activities protected by the Act. Conversely, some
limitation upon an employer's freedom regarding supervisors is necessary to preclude
establishment of an insulated, supervisory conduit for illegal actions against statutory
employees. The Board accommodates these sometimes conflicting policies by its
continued proscription of employer conduct that directly interferes with employees'
exercise of their own section 7 rights, such as supervisory discharges for giving
adverse testimony or refusing to commit unfair labor practices.
INDIVIDUAL ACrIvITY
Section 7 guarantees to employees the rights to organize and join unions, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.8 7 Activity is clearly regarded as concerted when it involves or seeks to
involve group action, which is action involving more than one employee. 88
Further, under the Board's Alleluia Cushion8 9 doctrine ostensibly single em-
ployee complaints or protests were treated as concerted activity when the employee
sought to enforce social or protective labor legislation of benefit to all employees. 90
This result was predicated upon the doctrine of implied consent. Because the Legisla-
ture enacted certain laws for the protection and benefit of all employees, consent and
concert of action were deemed to arise from the mere assertion of such statutory
rights. No outward manifestation of support by fellow employees was required.
Therefore, when an employee sought to enforce certain social or protective labor
legislation the activity was deemed concerted absent evidence that fellow employees
disavowed the representation. 9 1 Under this doctrine the Board held concerted and
protected such conduct as an employee's protests concerning alleged sex-based dis-
86. Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (1982). The Board concluded as follows:
In the final analysis, the instant case, and indeed all supervisory discharge cases, may be resolved by this
analysis: The discharge of supervisors is unlawful when it interferes with the right of employees to exercise their
rights under Section 7 of the Act, as when they give testimony adverse to their employers' interest or when they
refuse to commit unfair labor practices. The discharge of supervisors as a result of their participation in union or
concerted activity-either by themselves or when allied with rank-and-file employees-is not unlawful for the
simple reason that employees, but not supervisors, have rights protected by the Act.
Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
88. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB,
206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); Ohio Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1597 (1951); Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951). The
concept does not extend to so-called individual, isolated gripes. See NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir. 1953); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949). See generally Gorman & Finkin, The
Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286 (1981);
Note, Protection of Individual Action as "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CoNELt. L.
REv. 369 (1983); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 72-75, 136-42.
89. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
90. See id. at 1000. See generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 n.15 (1978), and cases cited therein.
91. See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975); Jim Causley Pontiac, Div. Jim Causley, Inc., 232
N.L.R.B. 125 (1977), remanded, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980); B & P Motor Express, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 653 (1977).
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crimination, 92 an employee's complaint to the Wage & Hour Division of the U.S.
Department of Labor, 93 and the individual filing of charges with the EEOC and a
state FEP agency.9 4
In Meyers Industries, Inc.95 the Board overruled Alleluia Cushion and held that
the concept of protected, concerted activity entails an objective standard. It requires a
factual showing of some group action or collective activity, or action as a representa-
tive on behalf of a group. 9 6 Solitary employee invocation of relevant workforce
legislation (e.g., OSHA) will no longer be sufficient to invoke statutory concerted-
ness, and consent or concert of action will not be presumed or inferred from the mere
assertion of such statutory rights or other rights of possible group concern.
97
In Meyers Industries the Board found that the employer did not violate section
8(a)(1) by discharging a driver because of his safety complaints and refusal to drive
an unsafe truck after reporting the truck's condition to the Tennessee Public Service
Commission. 98 Although another employee had also complained about the truck in
the discharged driver's presence, the Board said that "individual employee concern,
even if openly manifested by several employees on an individual basis, is not suf-
ficient evidence to prove concert of action." 99 The Board stated further:
[T]o find an employee's activity to be "concerted," we shall require that it be engaged in
with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the
employee himself. Once the activity is found to be concerted, an 8(a)(1) violation will be
found if, in addition, the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee's
92. See Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290, enforcement denied, 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977).
93. See Triangle Tool & Eng'g, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1976).
94. See King Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1976).
Under its Interboro doctrine, the Board also holds that individual action to enforce contract terms is concerted
activity. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally
Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 152 (1972). The Board regards the individual's enforcement of the contract not only as redounding to the benefit of
all employees, but also as merely extending the concerted activity which led to and culminated in the contract.
In NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984), the Court approved the Board's Interboro doctrine. The
Court held that an individual truckdriver was engaged in concerted activity when he refused to drive a truck that he
honestly and reasonably believed to be unsafe, when the contract provided that employees were not required to drive
unsafe vehicles. Id. at 1516. The Court agreed with the Board that the individual assertion of a right contained in a
contract is an extension of the concerted action that produced the agreement, and that the assertion of such a right affects
the rights of all employees covered by the contract. The activity is concerted if based upon the honest and reasonable
invocation of a contractual right, whether or not the conduct is actually protected or the contract specifically raised.
95. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984).
96. Id. at 1028-29.
97. See generally NLRB General Counsel on Board's Meyers Industries, Inc. Decision, [News and Background
Information] 115 LAB. REL. RE . (BNA) 284 (April 9, 1984) (NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC84-3,
Feb. 16, 1984).
98. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1030 (1984). The Board distinguished Interboro Contractors, Inc.,
157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), as involving an individual attempt to enforce a
collective bargaining agreement.
99. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1030 (1984) (emphasis in original). The Board stated:
[Wie are persuaded that the per se standard of concerted activity, by which the Board determines what ought to
be of group concern and then artificially presumes that it is of group concern, is at odds with the Act. The Board
and courts always considered, first, whether the activity is concerted, and only then, whether it is protected.
This approach is mandated by the statute itself, which requires that an activity be both "concerted" and
"protected." A Board finding that a particular form of individual activity warrants group support is not a
sufficient basis for labeling that activity "concerted" within the meaning of Section 7.
Id. at 1028 (emphasis in original).
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activity, the concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the adverse employment
action at issue (e.g., discharge) was motivated by the employee's protected concerted
activity. 1oo
The Board noted that "absent special circumstances" similar to those in NLRB
v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 01 "there is no violation if an employer, even mistakenly,
imposes discipline in the good-faith belief that an employee engaged in mis-
conduct." 1
0 2
Section 7 is the heart of the Act. The rights it guarantees to employees to engage
in organization, unionization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities are
of supreme importance under our national scheme of labor-management relations. In
the past the Board has given an expansive reading to the section 7 concept of
concerted activity, treating ostensibly single employee activities (i.e., complaints and
protests) as concerted when they reflected or embodied group concerns.
For reasons more nice than real, the Board has retreated to a niggardly reading of
section 7, resurrecting outmoded concepts of "uniquely personal rights." The con-
cept of "uniquely personal rights" in the context of the employment relationship has
been rejected by the Supreme Court under section 301 of the Act and should be
rejected under section 7 as well. 10 3 Contrary to the Board's position in Meyers
Industries, the reality is that social and protective labor legislation arises from and is
inextricably intertwined with employee group concerns. Such laws arose from the
needs and desires of all employees, and were enacted by the Legislature for the
protection and benefit of all employees. Concert of action is therefore implicit in the
mere assertion of these statutory rights, even by one individual.
The Court recently endorsed the proposition that individual action to enforce
contract terms constitutes concerted activity because the individual action not only
redounds to the benefit of all employees but also represents an extension of the
concerted activity underlying the contract.'o4 Assuming arguendo the rather dubious
proposition that literal concertedness must be found to invoke section 7 pro-
100. Id. at 1029 (footnote omitted).
101. 379 U.S. 21 (1964). The Burnup & Sims Court upheld the Board's finding that an employer violated section
8(a)(1) by discharging an employee known to have engaged in protected activity even though the employer was motivated
by a good faith but mistaken belief that the employee engaged in misconduct during the protected activity. Id. at 23.
102. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.R.M. 1029 n.23 (1984).
103. Section 301 of the Act provides that suits for violation of contracts between employers and unions may be
brought in federal court. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Association of Weastinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), the Court held that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction under section 301 over union actions to recover employees' wage claims. Id. at 461. The Court regarded such
claims as uniquely personal to the individual employee. The Westinghouse doctrine was later squarely rejected in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962), in which the Court stated:
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising from a collective bargaining contract
should be excluded from the coverage of § 301 has thus not survived. The rights of individual employees
concerning rates of pay and conditions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining contracts. Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are
to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and many times precipitate grave questions concern-
ing the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining contract on which they are based. To
exclude these claims from the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the administra-
tion of collective bargaining contracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal substantive law.
See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
104. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984), discussed more fully supra note 94.
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tections,t 0 5 the same rationale may be applied to individual action to enforce social
and protective legislation. Thus, such enforcement benefits all employees and arises
from the concertedness precipitating the legislation. Further concertedness is found in
the concept of the employee as a private attorney general representing and enforcing
public rights.
10 6
Equally significant and dubious is the Board's imposition of a discriminatory
motivation requirement as a predicate for a section 8(a)(1) violation. While motive
has played an uncertain role in independent 8(a)(1) situations,'0 7 it has been well
established over the years that section 8(a)(1) is violated in a wide variety of situa-
tions irrespective of motive. The applicable test in appropriate cases has been objec-
tive, not subjective, that is, whether or not there is a reasonable tendency that the
particular employer conduct will interfere with section 7 rights. 1
0 8
In NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.,' 0 9 for example, the Court held that an employ-
er violated section 8(a)(1) by discharging an employee known to have engaged in
protected activity even though the employer was motivated by a good faith but
mistaken belief that the employee had engaged in misconduct during the protected
activity.' 1 0 The Board found the discharges violative of both sections 8(a)(1) and
(3). 111 The Court, however, found it unnecessary to reach questions under section
8(a)(3) (which requires discriminatory motivation) because the Court found a plain
105. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1031 (1984) (Zimmerman, dissenting).
106. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (right of individual employee to union representation at
investigatory-disciplinary interview as concerted, protected activity).
107. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308-11 (1965); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405 (1964). See generally Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing,
Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967); Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American
Ship Building and Brown Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193 (1966).
108. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978);
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. Bumup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964); NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
109. 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
110. Id. at 22. Upon being advised that two union activist employees threatened to use dynamite to get the union in if
the union did not acquire the requisite union membership authorizations, the employer discharged the two. The Board
found that the charges were untrue, that the employees actually made no threats against the employer's property, and that
the employer's honest belief in the truth of the charges was not a defense. Id. at 21-22.
Ill. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on
union considerations, that is, by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). The section
thus proscribes (1) discrimination (2) that encourages or discourages union membership. The touchstone under section
8(a)(3) is employer union-related motivation. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers. Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). "It is the 'true
purpose' or 'real motive' in hiring or firing that constitutes the test." Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667, 675 (1961). "The statutory language 'discrimination ... to... discourage' means that the finding of a
violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an anti-union purpose." NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967). Specific evidence of intent is not always required, and unlawful intent may
be inferred when it is a natural consequence of particular action. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); see
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967);
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). See generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YAIE L.J. 1269 (1968); Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 735 (1965); Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference
and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy ofAmerican Ship Building & Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
81 (1970).
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violation of section 8(a)(1) "whatever the employer's motive."112 The Court noted
that "protected activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can be
discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in good faith.""' 13
The Board therefore takes a giant and rather disingenuous step when it incorporates a
blanket requirement of subjective motivation into section 8(a)(1)." 4
BARGAINING OBLIGATIONS
Employers and unions have respective and corresponding duties under sections
8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the Act to bargain with each other in good faith concerning
mandatory subjects of bargaining.' 15 Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain col-
lectively to include "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 116 Subjects included in the section 8(d) definition of "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" are mandatory subjects of bargaining
about which an employer and union must bargain and upon which either party may
insist to the point of impasse. 117 Only after bargaining impasse is reached may the
party take unilateral action on the matter."
18
Before a bargaining impasse is reached, however, unilateral action involving
mandatory bargaining subjects violates the good faith bargaining obligation. 9 If the
112. NLRB v. Bumup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22 (1964). The Court therefore did not reach the question of
whether the Board's alternative finding of discriminatory motivation was supported by substantial evidence.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Equally disingenuous and puzzling is the Board's token obeisance to Burnup & Sims while stating that section
8(a)(1) is not violated when an employer imposes discipline in the good faith but mistaken belief that an employee
engaged in misconduct. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
115. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982); see H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970);
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). Section 8(b)(3)
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of [section 9(a)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982); see NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See generally Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAzv. L. REv. 1401
(1958); Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv.
389 (1950); Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REv. 988 (1961); Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe,
Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CoaRNELL L. REv. 1009 (1968).
117. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Wamer Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); see also First Nat'l Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497 (1978); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). See generally Modjeska, Guess Who's Coming to the Bargaining Table, 39 OHto Sr. L.J.
415 (1978).
118. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Landis Tool Co., 193 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1952); NLRB v.
Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951); see also American Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 446 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2170 (1984); Stone Boat Yard v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1910 (1984). An impasse is that stage of bargaining where a party asserting the existence of an impasse is
warranted in assuming that further bargaining would be futile. For the determination of when an impasse has been
reached, see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 115 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1984), reaffirming the
guidelines set forth in Taft Broadcasting Co., WDAF AM-FM TV, 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), review denied sub
nom. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Charles D.
Bonnano Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
119. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). See generally Schatzki, The Employer's UnilateralAct-A Per
Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. REv. 470 (1966).
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matter involves a permissive rather than a mandatory subject of bargaining, though,
the parties are not obligated to bargain about the matter.
120
Section 8(d) purports to relieve a party from midterm bargaining concerning
matters contained in the contract. In Jacobs Manufacturing Co.121 the Board held that
parties need not engage in midterm bargaining regarding mandatory matters con-
tained in the contract, but that absent waiver they must bargain regarding mandatory
matters neither contained in the contract nor discussed in negotiations.' 22 If the
matter involves a permissive rather than a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
parties are not obligated to engage in midterm or other bargaining and unilateral
midterm modification of the permissive term does not violate section 8(d). 23
Reversing its prior position, the Board recently held in Milwaukee Spring Divi-
sion of Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring 11)124 that an employer did not
violate sections 8(a)(1), (3), (5), or 8(d) by its nonconsensual, midterm, assembly
operations department relocation from a union to a nonunion facility to obtain lower
labor costs, when the contract did not preclude the move and the employer met its
obligation to bargain over the decision and its effects. 125 Neither the recognition nor
wage and benefit clauses constituted such contractual preclusion, said the Board, nor
did the relocation constitute a modification of the clauses within the meaning of
section 8(d). In the Board's view, it is "NLRB textbook law that an employer need
not obtain a union's consent on a matter not contained in the body of a collective-
bargaining agreement even though the subject is a mandatory subject of
bargaining." 126 Further, under section 8(d) an employer must obtain a union's con-
sent before implementing a change during the life of a contract only if the change is in
a mandatory term or condition contained in the contract. 127 The standard is the same,
said the Board, for work reassignment and relocation decisions. Absent specific
contractual prohibition, the employer may transfer or relocate work if the employer
first bargains in good faith to impasse and is not motivated by antiunion animus.
In Milwaukee Spring 11 the parties stipulated that the employer's decision to
relocate work from the unionized to the nonunionized plant turned upon a reduction
120. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 188 (1971). Thus, bargaining
is required over statutory subjects (that is, subjects within the statutory phrase), permitted but not required as to lawful
non-statutory subjects, and not permitted as to illegal subjects. See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note
18, at 757-869.
121. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). See generally Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 391-401 (1950); Cox & Dunlop,
The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950); Findling &
Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board-Another View, 51 COLuM. L. REv.
170 (1951); Wollett, The Duty to Bargain Over the "Unwritten" Terms and Conditions of Employment, 36 TEx. L. REV.
863 (1958).
122. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1218-19 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
123. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88 (1971).
124. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1984), reversing 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982), and overruling
Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977), enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978); University of Chicago, 210
N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975); and in relevant part Los Angeles Marine
Hardware Co., a Div. of Mission Marine Assoc., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir.
1979).
125. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065, 1068-69 (1984).
126. Id. at 1067.
127. Id. at 1066.
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in labor costs, and that the decision was therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In Otis Elevator Co., Wholly Owned Subsidiary of United Technologies, 128 discussed
more fully below, the Board indicated that if the parties had not so stipulated in
Milwaukee Spring II the Board would have found the decision to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining because the decision turned upon labor costs.
Further, in Otis Elevator Co. the Board reversed its prior position and held that
the employer did not violate sections 8(a)(1) and (5), or 8(d), by refusing to bargain
with the union over its decision to transfer and consolidate certain unit work from its
New Jersey facility to its Connecticut facility, when the decision was based upon
economic considerations unrelated to labor costs. 129 The employer transferred and
consolidated its research and development functions because the New Jersey facility
used outdated technology, produced a noncompetitive product, and duplicated other
operations, and because a newer and larger research and development center was
available in Connecticut. The employer's aim was to improve research, development,
and the marketability of its product. The decision did not turn upon labor costs,
although the Board noted that labor costs may have been one of the underlying factors
stimulating the evaluation that generated the ultimate decision. 30
The Board found that the employer's decision turned upon a fundamental change
in the nature and direction of the business, was not amenable to collective bargaining,
and therefore was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board considered the
critical factor to be the essence of the decision itself, that is, whether it turned upon a
change in the scope, nature, or direction of the business, or upon labor costs.131
Neither the effect on employees nor the union's ability to offer alternatives was
critical. Recognizing management needs for predictability, flexibility, speed, secre-
cy, and profitability, the Board concluded that decisions affecting the scope, nature,
or direction of a business are excluded from mandatory bargaining under section
8(d). 132 Such decisions include, said the Board, decisions to sell or merge all or part
of a business; to dispose of assets; to restructure or consolidate operations; to sub-
contract; 133 to invest in labor-saving machinery; to change methods of finance, sales,
advertising, or product design; and all analogous decisions. Bargaining over the
effects of such decisions remains mandatory. 13
4
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB 135 the Court held that the employ-
128. 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984), reversing 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981).
129. Id. at 1281.
130. Id. at 1282. No allegation was made that the employer acted for antiunion reasons or from a desire to modify or
lower labor costs.
131. Id. at 1283.
132. Id.
133. Conversely, for example, the Board would find subcontracting that turns upon a reduction in labor costs rather
than a change in basic operations to be a mandatory subject. The Board stated:
Included within Section 8(d) ... are all decisions which turn upon a reduction of labor costs. This is true
whether the decision may be characterized as subcontracting, reorganization, consolidation, or relocation, if the
decision in fact turns on direct modification of labor costs and not on a change in the basic direction or nature of
the enterprise.
Id. at 1283. That labor costs may be an important factor in the decision, said the Board, does not alter the analysis. Rather,
the labor cost element of the decision can be adequately dealt with in the effects bargaining.
134. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
135. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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er violated section 8(a)(5) by contracting out maintenance work without first bargain-
ing with the union over that decision. 136 The Court held that the type of contracting-
out involved in the case-"the replacement of employees in the existing unit with
those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment"-was a mandatory subject of bargaining under sections 8(a)(5) and
8(d). 137
The Court noted that the contracting-out of the unit work and the resultant
employment termination were "well within the literal meaning of the phrase 'terms
and conditions of employment"' in section 8(d), and that holding contracting-out to
be a mandatory subject of bargaining promotes "the fundamental purpose of the Act
by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management within the
framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace." 38 The
Court also noted the propriety of submitting the particular dispute to collective
bargaining because the decision did not alter the employer's basic operation: the
maintenance work still had to be performed in the plant, no capital investment was
contemplated, and the employer had simply replaced existing employees with those
of the independent contractor to perform the same work under similar conditions of
employment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart observed as follows:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain
collectively regarding such managerial decisions, [investment in labor-saving machinery,
liquidation of assets, termination of business, volume and kind of advertising ex-
penditures, product design, manner of financing and sales] which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and
the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of
employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employ-
ment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to the
duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to the
basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employ-
ment security should be excluded from that area. 139
Thereafter, in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB 14 0 the Court held that
the employer had no duty to bargain with the union over its decision to close a part of
its business,' 141 but that the employer was required to bargain about the effect of its
decision. 142 The employer terminated its contract to provide maintenance work for a
nursing home and discharged those employees who worked for it at the home without
bargaining with the union concerning either the decision to terminate the contract or
136. id. at 215. Upon expiration of the contract the employer contracted out bargaining unit maintenance work for
economic reasons without fust bargaining with the union; the maintenance work continued to be performed in the plant
with employees of the independent contractor instead of the employer's employees who were discharged. Id. at 206.
137. Id. at 215.
138. Id. at 210-11.
139. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Douglas and Harlan joined the concurrence.
140. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
141. Id. at 686.
142. Id. at 681.
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the effect of that change on unit employees. 143 The decision to terminate the nursing
home contract was based upon economic considerations.
1 44
The premise underlying mandatory bargaining, said the Court, is that collective
discussion backed by the parties' economic power will result in better decisions for
labor, management, and society. "This will be true, however, only if the subject
proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the bargaining pro-
cess." 145 The Court applied a benefits-burdens analysis, 146 and held that the employ-
er's need for freedom in making an economic partial closing decision outweighed the
benefits that might be obtained by the union's participation in that decision. The
decision, therefore, was not a mandatory bargaining subject. 47
The Court indicated that labor costs were not a crucial circumstance in the
economically based partial termination. Instead, the underlying dispute concerned the
management fee over which the union had no control or authority. According to the
Court, the employer had no intention of replacing the discharged employees or
moving the operation elsewhere; no claim of antiunion animus was made; and the
case did not involve an employer's abrogation of ongoing negotiations or an existing
bargaining agreement because the union was not selected or certified as bargaining
representative until after the economic problem had arisen. 148 The Court noted that
while the employer's business enterprise did not involve large capital investments in
single locations, the absence of significant investment or withdrawal of capital was
not significant. The Court also noted that the decision to terminate work at the
nursing home represented a significant change in the employer's operations, a change
in the scope and direction of the enterprise, similar to a decision whether to be in
business at all or to open a new line of business.
In Milwaukee Spring II and Otis Elevator I the Board thus endorses and adopts
the Fibreboard concurring view of Justice Stewart that section 8(d) delineates a
143. The employer was engaged in the business of providing housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance, and related
services for commercial customers. It supplied each customer, at the customer's premises, with a contracted-for labor
force and supervision in return for reimbursement of its labor costs and payment of a set fee. The employer contracted for
and hired personnel separately for each customer, and did not transfer employees between locations.
144. The termination resulted from a dispute between the employer and the nursing home over the size of the
management fee.
145. Id. at 678; see Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979), in which the Court held that in-plant cafeteria
and vending machine food and beverage prices are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Classifying such subjects
as mandatory, said the Court, channels an area of common dispute into the collective bargaining process, and is neither
too trivial nor difficult for resolution in such process, nor beyond the employer's control.
146. The Court stated as follows:
Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of
a profitable business. It also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach
decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling its conduct an unfair labor practice. Congress did not
explicitly state what issues of mutual concern to union and management it intended to exclude from mandatory
bargaining. Nonetheless, in view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be
required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business.
452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
147. Id. at 686. The Court stated that it intimated no view as to the duty to bargain concerning other types of
management decisions such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., and that such
cases were to be considered on their particular facts. Id. at 686 n.22.
148. Id. at 687-88.
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limited category of issues subject to compulsory bargaining, from which "core of
entrepreneurial control" decisions are excluded. The Board also extracts from Fibre-
board and First National a business direction-labor cost dichotomy, excluding the
former from the limited scope of section 8(d). The Board's bottom line may well be
right, for as the foregoing discussion of Fibreboard and First National reflects, those
opinions contain much language supportive of the Board's conclusion.
There is a risk, however, that the Board has overreached the Court. Fibreboard
and First National also seem to stress the amenability of the matter to meaningful
collective bargaining; they do not simply rely on the somewhat vaguer entrepreneur-
ial decision concept. The amenability determination requires an analysis of the un-
derlying decisional reasons. Consequently, particular business direction changes pre-
dicated upon non-labor cost or enterprise considerations may nevertheless be amen-
able to resolution through the collective bargaining process.
The Board essentially discards the many limitations specifically placed by the
Court on its First National decision, and ignores the Court's explicit declination to
extend its holding to such management decisions as plant relocations. Although the
Board may well be right in its prescience, one would assume that the Court's preci-
sion and caution were intentional, and that had the Court been so inclined it could
easily have articulated the somewhat simplistic business direction-labor cost formula.
Instead, First National expressly relied upon a balancing test, and it seems that plant
relocation and other decisions different in kind from partial closings should be an-
alyzed in each case under the same test. 149 Under the First National benefits-burdens
analysis, the question is whether the decision is based upon labor costs or other
factors amenable to resolution through collective bargaining.
SUPERSENIORITY FOR UNION STEWARDS
The Board and courts generally have held that absent adequate justification,
contractual provisions granting special benefits to union officials or stewards are
violative of sections 8(a)(1) and (3), and 8(b)(2) and (1)(A). 150 Under Board doctrine
established in Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.,15 1 superseniority for union stewards is
presumptively lawful when restricted to layoff and recall; the General Counsel has the
burden of rebutting the presumption. 52 Although the seniority preference for stew-
ards relates benefits to union status, disparate treatment is rationalized because it
encourages the continued job presence of the steward and thereby furthers effective
contract administration for the benefit of all unit employees. Superseniority pro-
149. See generally NLRB General Counsel on Duty to Bargain Cases H1, 1981 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 315
(NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC 81-57, Nov. 30, 1981); NLRB General Counsel on Duty to Bargain
Cases I, 1981 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 312 (NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum GC 81-83, July 14,
1981).
150. See NLRB v. American Can Co., 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein; Dairylea Coop., Inc.,
219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Note,
Superseniority: Post-Dairylea Developments, 29 CASE W. REs. 499 (1979); Note, Superseniority: Latitudes and Limita-
tions, 49 U. CN. L. REV. 832 (1980).
151. 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
152. See generally NLRB General Counsel Memorandum on Dairylea, 1978 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 330
(NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 78-59, Sept. 19, 1978); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 18, at
234-35, 245-46.
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visions not limited to layoff and recall are presumptively unlawful, and the party
asserting their validity has the burden of rebutting the presumption by establishing
justification. 153
The Board had extended the Dairylea presumption of validity to any union
officer or official whose responsibilities bore a direct relationship to the effective and
efficient representation of bargaining unit employees. 154 Superseniority provisions
were unlawful, however, when applied to union officials with strictly internal union
duties, and to individuals not involved in unit representation in contract or grievance
administration or in furthering the bargaining relationship. 155 The Board recently
reversed the foregoing extension and ruled that grants of superseniority which extend
beyond employees actually responsible for grievance processing and on-the-job con-
tract administration will be found unlawful. 156 Superseniority must be limited to
union employee-agents who must be on the job to perform duties directly related to
contract administration. 157
Dairylea rests on the proposition that employees have section 7 rights to refrain
from union activities in general and from being union stewards in particular. Conse-
quently, employees should suffer no employment detriment when they exercise these
rights. Stewardships generally go to enthusiastic or committed unionists, and refrain-
ing employees generally are not made stewards. Thus, under a superseniority system
refraining employees suffer the employment detriment of impaired seniority com-
pared to employees who become stewards. The ultimate question then becomes one
of justification for this disparate treatment. Justification is found in representational
service for the entire bargaining unit.
Tested under these principles, the Board's retrenchment seems appropriate. The
grant of superseniority to those who do not perform steward or other on-the-job
153. See Sheaffer Eaton Div. of Textron, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1980); Brotherhood of Painters and Allied
Trades, Dist. Council 2, 239 N.L.R.B. 1378 (1979), enforcement denied sub nom. Paintsmiths, Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d
1326 (8th Cir. 1980); Preston Trucking Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 464 (1978), enforced sub nom. Local 20, Int'l Blid. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Union Carbide Corp., Chem. & Plastics Operations Div., 228
N.L.R.B. 1152 (1977); Hospital Serv. Plan, 227 N.L.R.B. 585 (1976); Auto Warehousers, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 628
(1976), enforcement denied, 571 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1978).
154. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 623 (Limpco Mfg., Inc.), 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977), review
denied sub nom. D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 1331 (Chrysler Corp.), 228 N.L.R.B. 1446 (1977); Otis Elevator Co., 231
N.L.R.B. 1128 (1977).
155. See American Can Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 736 (1979), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981); McQuay-Norris,
Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1981).
156. Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Board overruled United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local
623 (Limpco Mfg., Inc.), 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977), review denied sub nom. D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.
1978), and such of its progeny as American Can Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 736 (1979), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
157. Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Applying the above principles in UAW, Local 561 (Scovill, Inc.).
266 N.L.R.B. 952 (1983), the Board held unlawful the maintenance and enforcement of a contractual provision granting
superseniority to certain union officials (recording secretary, financial secretary, trustees, guide, sergeant-at-arms, and
board members at large), when none of the normal duties of the officials involved day-to-day administration of the
contract or any steward-like functions. Id. at 953. The Board found presumptively lawful the shift protection portion of the
clause as applied to those grievance handlers with steward-like duties. Id. at 953 n.9; see Wayne Transp., Div. of Wayne
Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 116 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1984); UAW, Local 1384 (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 267 N.L.R.B. No. 206,
114 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1983); Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 267 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 114 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1983).
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contract administrative functions does not appear justifiable. While such a grant
might promote the effective and efficient representation of employees, this is in-
sufficient justification for the inherently discriminatory effect of superseniority pro-
visions. Because the grant of superseniority is inherently discriminatory, the recipi-
ent's union position should require the maintenance of an on-the-job presence at
specific times necessary to ensure contract enforcement and prompt grievance pro-
cessing.
INTERROGATION
The Board generally has regarded employer interrogation of employees concern-
ing their union or other section 7 activities as unlawful, absent legitimate purpose and
proper safeguards. 158 The theory is that interrogation creates employee fear of
reprisal. 159 Interrogation generally has not been deemed per se unlawful, though.
Rather, the test has been whether under all the circumstances the interrogation rea-
sonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employee exercise of protected
rights.' 60 The answer is to be found in the record considered as a whole.61
In several cases involving interrogation of open and active union supporters, the
Board appeared to have wandered into a per se approach, finding the interrogation
inherently coercive. 162 The Board recently overruled these cases and reaffirmed the
applicability of the totality of circumstances test to interrogation in general, and to
interrogation of open and active union supporters in particular. 163
158. See Clinton Foods, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 667 (1979); Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967); Blue
Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATON
AND CoLLECnvE BAR ANING 173-77 (1976); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 119-25.
159. The essence of the Board's rationale was captured in the following statement in Struksnes Constr. Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062 (1967):
In our view any attempt by an employer to ascertain employee views and sympathies regarding unionism
generally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the mind of the employee if he replies in favor of unionism and,
therefore, tends to impinge on his Section 7 rights. As we have pointed out, "An employer cannot discriminate
against union adherents without first ascertaining who they are." That such employee fear is not without
foundation is demonstrated by the innumerable cases in which the prelude to discrimination was the employer's
inquiries as to the union sympathies of his employees.
For criticism of the underlying assumptions see UNION REPRFsENTATION ELE CIONS, supra note 30, at 10, 25, 127-28,
149.
160. See Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 593-94 (1954).
161. See id. at 594, in which the Board agreed with the Second Circuit's view in NLRB v. Syracuse Color Press,
Inc., 209 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954), that "the time, the place, the personnel involved, the
information sought, and the employer's conceded preference, all must be considered in determining whether or not the
actual or likely effect of the interrogations upon the employees constitutes interference, restraint or coercion." Id. at 599.
In Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964) the court, generally endorsing the Board's comprehensive
approach, suggested that the following factors be considered in determining whether a particular interrogation is coercive:
(1) The background, i.e. is there a history of employer hostility and discrimination? (2) The nature of the
information sought, e.g. did the interrogator appear to be seeking information on which to base taking action
against individual employees? (3) The identity of the questioner, i.e. how high was he in the company
hierarchy? (4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g. was employee called from work to the boss's office? Was
there an atmosphere of "unnatural formality"? (5) Truthfulness of the reply.
See NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965); see also Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063,
(1967) (necessasy safeguards for employer poll to verify union claim of majority status); Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965) (necessary safeguards for
interrogation in preparation for trial).
162. E.g., PPG Indus., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980); Anaconda Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1091 (1979); Paceco, Div.
of Freuhauf Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 399 (1978); ITT Automotive Elec. Prods. Div., 231 N.L.R.B. 878 (1977).
163. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 116 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1026 (1984).
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The Board's excision of the open union adherent exception to the overall cir-
cumstances test not only accords with the established precedent noted earlier but also
accommodates constitutional concerns. Section 8(c) of the Act, implementing the
first amendment, provides that the expression of "any views, argument, or opinion"
shall not be "evidence of an unfair labor practice" unless such expression contains a
"threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit" in violation of section 8(a)(1).' 64
Absent threats or promises, free speech notions protect noncoercive questioning.
Moreover, absent threats or promises no evidential foundation exists for inference of
a fear of reprisal, the touchstone of unlawful interrogation. Further, concerns over
employer identification of and resultant retaliation against employees are simply
moot in cases involving open, active union adherents. Disclosure in such cases is
already made by the employee.
No SOLICITATION RULES
Restrictions on employee solicitation during nonworking hours and on distribu-
tion during nonworking hours in nonworking areas have long been held violative of
section 8(a)(1) unless the employer justifies the restrictions by establishing that
special circumstances make the rule necessary to maintain production or dis-
cipline.' 6 Rules prohibiting solicitation during the employees' own time are pre-
sumptively invalid. 166 Conversely, working time is for work, and rules prohibiting
solicitation during working time are presumptively valid.' 67
When specifically interpreting particular employer rules, however, the Board
has occasionally distinguished between prohibitions using the terms "working
hours" and "working time." The Board generally has held that rules using "working
hours" are presumptively invalid because the term covers the entire work shift,
thereby embracing the employees' own time (i.e., lunch and rest periods). 16S The
Board has vacillated, however, concerning construction of the phrase "working
time." Reversing course once again, the Board recently held rules prohibiting
solicitation during "working time" 169 to be presumptively valid because the term
covers the period when employees are performing actual job duties and does not
164. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982); see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Golub Corp.,
388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co.,
178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
165. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944); see also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (constitutional overtones). See
generally Fanning, Union Solicitation and Distribution of Literature on the Job-Balancing the Rights of Employers and
Employees, 9 GA. L. REv. 367 (1975); Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv.
73 (1964); Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266
(1958).
166. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945).
167. See id. at 803 n.10. See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 88-107.
168. See Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 750 (1974).
169. Compare id. (rules using "working time" presumptively valid) with T.R.W. Bearings Div., T.R.W., Inc.,
257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981) (rules using "working time" presumptively invalid).
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embrace the employees' own time. 170 In the Board's view, return to the longstanding
distinction between "working hours" and "working time" accorded with general
understanding and rules promulgated thereunder.
The reasonable, alternative interpretations of "working hours" and "working
time" may be debated ad infinitum.171 Suffice to say such judgments are uniquely
within the province of the Board. 172 The particular outcome may be less important in
this area than the guideline effect. (This is not to suggest that definitional confusion
may not impact adversely upon employees, for example, by either precautionary
avoidance of permissible activity or revelation of union sympathies by clarification
requests.) Because employers and unions rely heavily on such guidelines in their
daily affairs, however, these rules of the game should not be lightly or unnecessarily
changed but should be altered only when compelling reasons of law or policy so
demand. Cyclical reversals predicated essentially upon political incumbency hardly
rise to this level.
Decisions (and reversals) such as the foregoing and certain others discussed
herein raise fundamental questions concerning administrative policymaking. The
Board has substantive rulemaking as well as adjudicatory authority but has chosen not
to use its rulemaking powers. '7 3 While the choice between proceeding by general rule
or by individual, ad hoc adjudication is essentially within the discretion of the
agency,' 74 rulemaking has much to commend itself generally in labor law and partic-
ularly in areas such as the foregoing (i.e., no-solicitation rules). The notification and
public participation elements of the rulemaking process suggest not only the in-
creased soundness of the emergent rule, but also increased acceptance and com-
pliance. Notice of forthcoming regulation accompanied by an opportunity to be heard
is thereby given the entire labor-management community. Justice Douglas once
observed that through rulemaking "[algencies discover that they are not always
repositories of ultimate wisdom; they learn from the suggestions of outsiders and
often benefit from that advice."' 75 Rulemaking can command an evidentiary depth
and policy scope far superior to ad hoc adjudication. By its prospective nature,
rulemaking also avoids the often inequitable retroactive impact of adjudicatory de-
cisions.
Administrative inertia, substantive uncertainty, and aversion to the more binding
nature of regulations undoubtedly contribute to the Board's avoidance of rulemaking.
170. Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 115 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1983), overruling T.R.W. Bearings Div.,
T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981), and reaffirming Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974).
171. See, e.g., Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974) (majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions).
172. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978); see also Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793, 798-800 (1945).
173. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 779 n.2 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally
Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571
(1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
174. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). See generally Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative
Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 83 (1977); Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965).
175. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-78 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
One suspects that the Board is ignorant of and intimidated by the mysteries of the
rulemaking process; it is certainly inexperienced therein. 176 Promulgation of a rul6
involves a more definitive articulation of contemplated regulatory control than does
adjudication and leaves less room for indecision. Lastly, the Board could not ignore
much less reverse rules and regulations with the fickle dispatch now accorded ad-
judicatory precedents. 177
STRIKER MISCONDUCT
In Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. 178 the Board reversed established precedent 79
and held that verbal threats directed by striking employees against nonstriking em-
ployees warranted an employer's refusal to reinstate the strikers, even though the
threats were unaccompanied by physical conduct. Such threats may tend to intimidate
or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights, said the Board, and
therefore are unprotected.180 Board Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter further
indicated that when evaluating the appropriateness of reinstatement of unfair labor
practice strikers, they would no longer balance the severity of the employer's unfair
labor practices which provoked the strike against the gravity of the strikers' mis-
conduct.' 8' (Board Members Dennis and Zimmerman did not join this portion of the
decision.) Rather, in cases involving picket line and strike misconduct they would
deny reinstatement and backpay to "employees who exceed the bounds of peaceful
and reasoned conduct."' 182
In Clear Pine Mouldings nonstrikers were told they would be straightened out,
their fingers would be broken, they would live to regret it, their homes or garages
would be burned, and they would be killed. Strikers sometimes accompanied the
threats by waving clubs and beating on cars. One can hardly fault the Board for
finding this strike misconduct unprotected. Violent conduct as well as conduct "clas-
sified as 'indefensible' by any recognized standard of conduct" 183 traditionally has
been deemed unprotected. My concern is not with the result reached by the Board in
this class of cases, but rather with the loose language utilized by the Board in its
articulated standard of "peaceful and reasoned conduct."
Central to labor's long march toward worker betterment has been legal certifica-
tion of the legitimacy of the primary strike. With the growth of industrial empires, the
bargaining power of the individual worker became illusory. 184 Employee combina-
tion and unionization were essential to give workers some semblance of equality of
176. Some wags might note that the Board could start with L. MODiESKA, ADMINISTRATVE LAw-PRAcrTCE AND
PROCEDURE (1982).
177. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Cities of
Anaheim v. FERC, 723 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1984).
178. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 115 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1984).
179. E.g., Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304 (1973).
180. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 115 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1114-15 (1984).
181. Id. at 1116.
182. Id.
183. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962); see NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
184. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
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bargaining power to improve their wages, hours, and working conditions. 185
Recognition of the union as bargaining agent and a resultant collective bargaining
process under which the parties order their own industrial relationship by contract
became fundamental to the attainment of industrial peace.' 86 The use of economic
force, weapons, and pressure are essential ingredients of the free collective bargain-
ing process recognized by our society and labor policy.' 87 Labor and management
shed much blood over the establishment of the foregoing principles and the validation
of "labor's cherished strike weapon."' 18
8
Congressional concern for preservation of the integrity of the primary strike
weapon, and recognition of the legitimate use of the strike, have been constant in
federal labor policy. 189 Section 13 of the Act reflects Congress' general solicitude for
strike activity by providing that "[n]othing in this subchapter, except as specifically
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right."' 90
185. See id.; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921); see also Beth
Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 497-98 (1978) ("Congress determined that the extension of organizational and
collective-bargaining rights would ameliorate these conditions flow wages and poor working conditions in the health-care
industry] and elevate the standard of patient care.").
As articulated years ago by Chief Justice Taft in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184, 209 (1921):
Labor unions ... were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in
dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and
family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave
the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal
on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a body in order by
this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with them. They were withholding their labor of
economic value to make him pay what they thought it was worth. The right to combine for such a lawful purpose
has in many years not been denied by any court. The strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful economic
struggle or competition between employer and employees as to the share or division between them of the joint
product of labor and capital.
186. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 182 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937); see also Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
187. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960) ("IThe use of economic pressure is not
a grudging exception to some policy of completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the
process of collective bargaining."); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967) ("The economic strike
against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms .. "); American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) ("Having protected employee organization in countervailance to the
employer's bargaining power, and having established a system of collective bargaining whereby the newly coequal
adversaries might resolve their disputes, the Act also contemplated resort to economic weapons should more peaceful
measures not avail."); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1963) ("This repeated solicitude for the
right to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which in
great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.").
188. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 183 (1967).
189. See NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 285-89 (1960); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 456-57
(1950). See generally Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951); Gregory, Constitutional
Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 49 Mtcs. L. REv. 191 (1950); Note, Labor Picketing and
Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); see NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960); see also National Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Local 761, IUE v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). As part of the 1959
amendments to the secondary boycott provisions of the Act, Congress added a proviso to section 8(b)(4) stating that
"nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
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Further attention to labor history is warranted. Prior to the 1930s, courts held
employee concerted action to be tortious and enjoinable conspiracy whenever they
deemed the particular means or objectives unlawful. The standard of lawfulness was
the judge's view of the desirability or undesirability of the activity.' 91 Congress
enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act' 92 to eliminate such subjective judgments from
federal court disposition of matters involving labor disputes. That Act specifically
restricted the use of the injunction in labor disputes, and enunciated the national labor
policy that workers "shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor . . . in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "193 In United
States v. Hutcheson'94 the Court described the effect of the Norris-La Guardia Act as
follows:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the
licit and the illicit ... are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means. 195
The guarantee of the right to engage in concerted activities provided by section 7
of the NLRA, 196 couched in the same language as the Norris-La Guardia Act,' 97 was
intended to further insulate employees from the common law conspiracy doctrine. 198
Giving effect to this labor law history over the years, the Board, with judicial
approval, generally avoided interpreting section 7 in a fashion that would invite
scrutiny of the fairness or unfairness, wisdom or unwisdom, desirability or un-
desirability of activities that were concerted in fact and did not violate clear statutory
prohibitions. Although under the Wagner Act the words of section 7 could not be
interpreted literally as immunizing all group activity, however conducted and without
regard to its aim, from such scrutiny, the exceptions were confined to situations in
which (1) the objective of the activity contravened the provisions or basic policies of
191. As Justice Brandeis related in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921):
[Concerted employee conduct] became actionable when done for a purpose which ajudge considered socially or
economically harmful and therefore branded as malicious and unlawful. It was objected that, due largely to
environment, the social and economic ideas of judges, which thus became translated into law, were prejudicial
to a position of equality between workingman and employer; that due to this dependence upon the individual
opinion of judges great confusion existed as to what purposes were lawful and what unlawful; and that in any
event Congress, not the judges, was the body which should declare what public policy in regard to the industrial
struggle demands.
Id. at 485 (footnotes omitted).
192. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
193. Id.; see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
194. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
195. Id. at 232.
196. See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951); Getman, The
Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1967);
Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-'"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TFax. L.
Rev. 378 (1969).
197. See American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1314 (1944) (Millis, Chr., dissenting).
198. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 257-58 (1949).
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the Act, or the provisions of a related federal statute, 199 or (2) the means used to
obtain a lawful objective were "indefensible" 20 0 by all recognized standards of
conduct. The latter category included, for example, major violence or similar mis-
conduct, 20 1 slowdowns, 20 2 intermittent work stoppages, 20 3 and the refusal to obey
orders while drawing pay.
20 4
When Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act in 1947, it was
aware of and approved the foregoing principles which the Board and the courts were
applying to define the scope of section 7.205 After the 1947 Amendments, the Board
and the courts continued to treat concerted activities as protected by section 7 unless
the activity was statutorily unlawful,2 °6 or the means used involved major violence or
misconduct 20 7 or were otherwise plainly indefensible by all accepted standards of
conduct.208 With Supreme Court approval the Board thus continued its refusal to
inquire into the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the employees' action. 20 9 The
199. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (strike which constituted mutiny under Criminal Code);
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co._ 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (strike in breach of collective bargaining contract); NLRB v. Draper
Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944) (strike to compel employer to recognize a minority union); NLRB v. Brashear Freight
Lines, 119 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1941) (strike to compel employer to recognize a minority union); Thompson Prods. Inc., 70
N.L.R.B. 13 (1946) (strike to compel employer to violate NLRB certification); and American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B.
1302 (1944) (strike to compel wage increase in violation of Wage Stabilization Act).
200. Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938).
201. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240
(1939).
202. See Underwood Mach. Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 641, 646-47 (1947), enforced, 179 F.2d I8 (1st Cir. 1949).
203. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 264-65 (1949).
204. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946); C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108
F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1939).
205. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
206. See American Rubber Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 47, 50-52 (7th Cir. 1954) (strike to compel a wage
increase violative of Wage Stabilization Board regulations); Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 385-89 (6th Cir. 1951)
(boycott to compel employer to recognize the union while a representation petition filed by another union was pending
before the Board); W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1043 (1955) (strike in breach of contract).
207. Victor Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (forcibly banning ingress to plant); Hart
Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 728, 753 (1950), enforcement denied, 190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951) (assault with deadly
weapon); Old Town Shoe Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 240, 244 (1950) (breaking window in nonstriker's home).
208. NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1955) (walkout without adequate
steps to protect plant); NLRB v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 212 F.2d 155, 163 (5th Cir. 1954) (walking offjob in
such manner as to create dangerous situation); Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 1594 (1954), enforced,
230 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1956) (refusal to perform assigned work while drawing pay); Montgomery Ward & Co., 108
N.L.R.B. 1175, 1177 (1954) (refusal to perform assigned work while drawing pay); Farber Bros., Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 748,
751-52 (1951) (slowdown); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336-37 (1950) (slowdown); Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 851, 853 (1949), review denied sub nom. Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950) (walkout
without adequate steps to protect plant).
NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), falls
within this category of indefensible conduct because of the union's failure to inform the public of any connection between
the pending labor dispute and a published attack upon the employer's product. The Court thus found the attack "as
adequate a cause for the discharge of its sponsors as if the labor controversy had not been pending." Id. at 477.
209. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). In
Washington Aluminum, the Court upheld the Board's finding that an employer violated section 8(a)(1) by discharging
employees who walked out in concert in protest over cold working conditions, notwithstanding that the employees had not
immediately prior to the walkout requested the employer to rectify the objectionable conditions or that leaving work
without permission violated plant rules. The Court stressed the breadth of section 7 protection and cautioned against
interpretation of the section in a "restricted fashion." Id. at 14. The following passage reflects the Court's view that
forfeiture of section 7 protection is warranted only in restricted, extreme situations:
It is of course true that § 7 does not protect all concerted activities, but that aspect of the section is not involved
in this case. The activities engaged in here do not fall within the normal categories of unprotected concerted
activities such as those that are unlawful, violent or in breach of contract. Nor can they be brought under this
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protected status under section 7 of a given activity has not been lost because em-
ployees could have selected a more prudent, fair, desirable, or reasonable method for
achieving their objective.210
Clear Pine Mouldings, with its standard of "peaceful and reasoned conduct"
and treatment of verbal threats as unprotected misconduct, could if strictly applied
constitute a major departure from the teachings of history, policy, and precedent, and
could run counter to the Court's admonition that section 7 not be interpreted in a
"restricted fashion.' '211
Board application of the Clear Pine Mouldings standard should also be informed
by history, precedent and policy in another regard. Labor disputes, and strikes in
particular, are frequently heated, passionate affairs wherein tempers flare and word
and deed (on all sides) may be less than pristine. Indeed, Justice Holmes termed the
labor-management conflict a "battle." ' 2 12 National labor policy has long been toler-
ant of such realities, as the Board recognized early in its history: "We are also
mindful of the fact. . that the emotional tension of a strike almost inevitably gives
rise to a certain amount of disorder and that conduct on the picket line cannot be
expected to approach the etiquette of the drawing room or of the conference
table." '2 13 Undue prohibition or intolerance of strike conduct constitutes a pro tanto
diminution of the right to strike guaranteed by the Act. 214 As stated by the Third
Circuit:
[S]ome disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A
strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human
beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot
words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical
combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct
the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in
the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of the Act... that
Court's more recent pronouncement [NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346
U.S. 464 (1953)] which denied the protection of § 7 to activities characterized as "indefensible" because they
were there found to show a disloyalty to the workers' employer which this Court deemed unnecessary to carry
on the workers' legitimate concerted activities. The activities of these seven employees cannot be classified as
"indefensible" by any recognized standard of conduct. Indeed, concerted activities by employees for the
purpose of trying to protect themselves from working conditions as uncomfortable as the testimony and Board
findings showed them to be in this case are unquestionably activities to correct conditions which modem
labor-management legislation treats as too bad to have to be tolerated in a humane and civilized society like
ours.
Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
210. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB v, Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S.
333, 344 (1938); Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1942). See generally I TRE DEvELoPtro LABOR
LAw, supra note 18, at 147-64.
211. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962).
212. Vegalahn v. Gurtner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of every man to get the most he
can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least
possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other side is the
necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.
Id.
213. Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 267, 288 (1940); see Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966): "Labor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs; the language that is commonplace there might well
be deemed actionable per se in some state jurisdictions."
214. See supra text accompanying notes 205-10.
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nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike. If this were not so the rights afforded to employees by the Act
would be indeed illusory.
215
National labor policy, informed by first amendment considerations, is also com-
mitted to free speech and debate in labor disputes, 2 16 and is tolerant of "the over-
enthusiastic use of rhetoric, "217 "intemperate, abusive, or insulting language,
' 2 18
and "bitter and extreme charges, counter-charges, unfounded rumors, vituperations,
personal accusations, misrepresentations and distortions."-
219
Misapplied, the Board's purported behavioral requirement of "peaceful and
reasoned conduct" could become overreaching and singularly out of place in the
labor milieu. 220 "[The Act's provisions are not indefinitely elastic, content-free
forms to be shaped in whatever manner the Board might think best conforms to the
proper balance of bargaining power."221
The indication that the Board may chance its policy of balancing employee
misconduct against employer unfair labor practices is troublesome. In NLRB v.
Thayer Co.222 the First Circuit per Judge Magruder held that in determining whether
reinstatement would effectuate the policies of the Act, the Board must balance the
seriousness of the employer's unlawful acts against the seriousness of the employees'
misconduct. 223 The Thayer doctrine was subsequently endorsed by the D.C. Circuit
in Local 833, UAW v. NLRB (Kohler Co.), 224 and adopted the following year by the
Board.225 In Kohler, Judge Bazelon noted the policy considerations underlying
Thayer and overlooked by the Board doctrine holding reinstatement automatically
precluded by employee misconduct. First, blatant employer unfair labor practices
may have provoked the unprotected action. Second, reinstatement is the only sanc-
tion that precludes the employer from profiting from the unfair labor practices
through discharges that could weaken or destroy the union. 226 Conversely, sanctions
other than discharge, including criminal prosecutions, civil actions, unfair labor
practice proceedings against unions, and the possibility of discharge, exist to prevent
215. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939).
216. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 282 (1974); Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940).
217. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 277 (1974).
218. Id. at 272.
219. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966).
220. Tortious or criminal violence or threats thereof are of course subject to state regulation inappropriate cases. See
UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Constr. Workers v.
Labumum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942); see also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress). See generally Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations:
Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. Rv. 1435 (1970); Cox, Recent Developments in Federal
Labor Law Preemption, 41 Omo ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337
(1972).
221. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965).
222. 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
223. Id. at 753. On remand the Board declined to follow the balancing doctrine in future cases. H. N. Thayer Co.,
115 N.L.R.B. 1591, 1595 (1956).
224. 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
225. See Blades Mfg. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 561 (1963), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965).
226. 300 F.2d 699, 709 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
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or remedy certain employee misconduct.22 7 The potential retreat from Thayer dis-
serves the foregoing policies. The automatic denial of reinstatement rights precludes
Board protection of employee rights, and is not essential to protect the legitimate
interests of employers and the public.
NONMAJORITY BARGAINING ORDERS
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.228 the Supreme Court held that the Board has the
power to issue a bargaining order when independent unfair labor practices make
holding a fair election impossible or improbable.22 9 The Court said that the Board
could issue a bargaining order in exceptional cases marked by outrageous and per-
vasive employer unfair labor practices, the so-called Gissel I situation. As discussed
more fully below, it is not clear from the Court's decision whether a remedial
bargaining order can issue in this situation if the union has never attained a majority.
The Court also said that the Board could issue a bargaining order in less extraordinary
cases marked by less pervasive practices which tend to undermine majority strength
and to impede the election processes. 230 In this Gissel II situation, the Board is to
balance union authorization cards against an election to determine the preferable
vehicle for effectuating employee free choice. A Gissel II bargaining order is appro-
priate, said the Court, only when the union had at some point attained a majority. 231
No bargaining order is appropriate in the case of minor or less extensive unfair labor
practices which have a minimal effect on the election machinery, the so-called Gissel
III situation.232
In 1982 in Conair Corp.2 3 3 the Board held it had authority to issue nonmajority
227. Id.
228. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
229. See generally Carson, The Gissel Doctrine: When a Bargaining Order Will Issue, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 85
(1972); Comment, Bargaining Orders Since Gissel Packing: Time to Blow the Whistle on Gissel?, 1972 Wis. L. REV.
1170; Note, Gissel Bargaining Orders: Circuit Courts Struggle to Limit NLRB Abuse, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1661
(1983).
230. 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
231. The Court stated:
The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary
cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election processes. The Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser showing of
employer misconduct is appropriate, we should reemphasize, where there is also a showing that at one point the
union had a majority; in such a case, of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free choice becomes as
important a goal as deterring employer misbehavior. In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion,
then, the Board can properly take into consideration the extensiveness of the employer's unfair practices in
terms of their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board
finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by
the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through
cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue ....
Id. at 614-15.
232. Id. at 615; see General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 1109, enforcement denied, 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972).
For compilation of cases in which the Board and the courts have determined which unfair labor practices warrant Gissel
bargaining orders see I THE DEVELOPINo LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 508-16.
233. 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), enforcement denied, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3511 (1984).
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bargaining orders in Gissel I situations. 234 The D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's decision, 235 holding that nonmajority bargaining orders are not within the
Board's remedial discretion. In Gourmet Foods, Inc.236 the Board recently reversed
its policy and held that it lacks authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders. 23 7
The cases before the Gissel Court involved Gissel H situations--"less ex-
traordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the
tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes' 2 3" - -
when the unions had in fact attained the requisite majority status at one time. The
Gissel II situations appear to be analogous to and consistent with prior rulings of the
Court upholding bargaining orders when the union's once-attained majority status
had been lost or dissipated due to employer unfair labor practices or employee
turnover.239 As noted above, however, it is not clear whether majority status is a
prerequisite to issuance of a bargaining order in a Gissel I situation. Nor is it clear
whether the Court even intended to speak authoritatively on the issue. The answer,
for those skillful enough to extract it, lies in the following ambiguous passage in
Gissel:
[T]he actual area of disagreement between our position here and that of the Fourth Circuit
is not large as a practical matter. While refusing to validate the general use of a bargaining
order in reliance on cards, 24° the Fourth Circuit nevertheless left open the possibility of
imposing a bargaining order, without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of
cards or otherwise, in "exceptional" cases marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive"
unfair labor practices. Such an order would be an appropriate remedy for those practices,
the court noted, if they are of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be
eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable
election cannot be had." NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (C.A. 4th Cir.
1967); see also NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 33 8 .241
234. Id at 1194; see United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1980) (NLRB
has authority to issue nonmajority bargaining order); cf. NLRB v. Empire Corp., 518 F.2d 860, 863 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975)
(suggestion of such authority); J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1971) (similar suggestion).
See generally Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3511 (1984), and cases
and materials cited therein.
235. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3511 (1984). The court
stated: "Strong arguments can be made for and against granting the Board the authority in question. Administrators and
judges, in our view, should not endeavor to anticipate or preempt debate on and decision of this issue in the political
arena." Id. at 1384.
236. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 116 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1984).
237. The Board stated:
[Tihe majority rule principle is such an integral part of the Act's current substance and procedure that it must be
adhered to in fashioning a remedy even in the most "exceptional" cases. We view the principle as a direct
limitation on the Board's existing statutory remedial authority as well as a policy that would render improper
exercise of any remedial authority to grant nonmajority bargaining orders which the Board might possess.
Id. at 1111.
238. 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
239. E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704-05
(1944); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942).
240. In Gissel the Court held, contrary to the Fourth Circuit, that authorization cards may be used as valid
indications of a union's majority and to support a bargaining order. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 766 (1977).
Concerning the general problems of authorization cards see Comment, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under Section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. CIi. L. REv. 387 (1966); Note, Union Authoriza-
tion Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
241. 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969). Professor Gorman has said of this passage that "the Court appeared to suggest
that it would not be necessary in such cases to inquire into majority status of the union on the basis of cards." R. GORMAN,
LABOR LAw UNIONIZATION AND CoLlecrivE BAROAININO 95 (1976).
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Both NLRB v. Heck's, Inc. and NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., cited by the
Supreme Court, involved situations in which the unions had acquired a majority of
authorization cards. The Fourth Circuit refused to approve bargaining orders in these
situations because it viewed authorization cards as unreliable. In Heck's the court
noted that "[t]his is not one of those extraordinary cases in which a bargaining order
might be an appropriate remedy for pervasive violations of § 8(a)(1)." '24 2 In Logan
Packing the court similarly rejected the issuance of a bargaining order in the particu-
lar case before it as a remedy for the employer's independent violations of section
8(a)(1). 243 The court added, however, in the dictum which formed the predicate for
the ambiguity in Gissel, that in "exceptional" cases involving "outrageous" and
"pervasive" unfair labor practices precluding the holding of a fair election, the
Board "may have the power" to issue a bargaining order as a remedy for the unfair
labor practices. 244 Such an order would then be imposed, said the court, "without
need of answering the question whether the union ever obtained majority status." 245
The court cautioned that "[the remedy is an extraordinary one, however, and, in
light of the guaranty of § 7 of employees' rights not to be represented, its use, if ever
appropriate, must be reserved for extraordinary cases.'"246 In Conair the D.C. Circuit
aptly termed the Court's ambiguous passage "[d]ictum reciting dictum" which "is
not a reliable indicator of the Court's probable view on a tense issue."'2 47
To impose upon employees a union that has never attained majority status is
clearly a proposition of novel and major dimensions. 248 The Gissel passages dis-
cussed above are at best ambiguous. On the one hand, it seems highly unlikely that
the Supreme Court meant to announce such a proposition by way of vague dictum.
Indeed, a substantial argument may be made that the proposition is so laden with
fundamental policy issues and conflicts that go to the heart of the Act that the matter
is appropriate only for congressional determination. On the other hand, it obviously
cannot be denied that Gissel is both ambiguous and suggestive.
Dominant, fundamental principles of national labor policy-attainment of em-
242. NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 1968). The court upheld the Board's finding that the
employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogation, threats of reprisal, creating the impression of surveillance,
and offering benefits. The court also upheld the Board's finding that the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by unlawfully discharging one employee. Id. at 338.
243. 386 F.2d 562, 571 (4th Cir. 1967). The court upheld the Board's findings that the employer engaged in
unlawful interrogation and surveillance in violation of section 8(a)(1). The court did comment, however, that the evidence
of violations was "minimal." Id. at 564.
244. Id. at 570.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 570-71.
247. 721 F.2d 1355, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3511 (1984).
248. There are of course a variety of situations in which majority status once established is thereafter presumed
despite a possible de facto minority situation. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954) (irrebuttable presumption
of majority status for one year following certification); Brennan's Cadillac, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 225 (1977) (irrebuttable
presumption of majority status for reasonable time after bargaining status established by voluntary recognition, Board
orders, or settlement agreements); Bartenders, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B.
651 (1974) (irrebuttable presumption of majority status during contract term, rebuttable presumption following contract
expiration); Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969) (rebuttable presumption of majority status following certifica-
tion year), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B.
583 (1966) (irrebuttable presumption of majority status for reasonable time afterbargaining status established by voluntary
recognition, Board orders, or settlement agreements).
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ployee free choice and majority rule, and deterrence of unfair labor practices-collide
in the nonmajority bargaining order proposition. To deny Board authority to issue
such orders enables employers to escape meaningful Board remedies and profit from
wrongdoing, for in a Gissel I situation by definition the prospect of an untainted
election within a reasonable time is remote. To grant Board authority may impose a
minority union upon the majority of employees. The Court has stated that there could
be "no clearer abridgement of § 7 of the Act" than to impose "an agency selected by
a minority of ... employees . . . upon the nonconsenting majority." 249
One compromise resolution of the conflicting labor policies, rejected by the
Board, is to incorporate a legal fiction to justify imposition of a nonmajority bargain-
ing order when employee free choice is not ascertainable because of Gissel I unfair
labor practices. However articulated, a "but-for" presumption is invoked: an in-
ference is drawn that but for the employer's unfair labor practices a majority of
employees would have selected the union as their bargaining representative. The
inference is more easily drawn when both (1) substantiality and (2) causal connection
are present. When, for example, a union has steadily and progressively signed up a
substantial number of employees in a short period, and following the employer's
unfair labor practices only a few or no employees sign up, the inference that but for
the unfair labor practices the union probably would have attained a majority may be
well founded. 25 0 When only the factor of substantiality is present, the drawing of the
inference is necessarily more strained.
UNION Fnmms
In Machinists, Local Lodge 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi)251 the Board over-
ruled Machinists, Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor I1)52 and held that a union may not
restrict the right of its members to resign from membership, and may not impose fines
upon members who resign from membership and return to work during a strike. 25 3
The Board found that while union rules restricting resignation advance legitimate
union interests in maintaining strike solidarity and protecting strikers' interests, they
substantially impair other fundamental national labor policies.25 4 Restrictions on
resignations contravene the section 7 rights of employees to refrain from protected
concerted activities, said the Board, including the rights to refrain from strikes and to
resign union membership. 5 The restrictions further impair the policy distinction
249. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bemhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 737
(1961); see Local 57, ILGWU v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967). The Act places a
"nonconsenting minority under the bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a majority of the workers." Brooks
v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954).
250. See generally Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1387-1401 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3511 (1984).
251. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1984).
252. 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enforcement denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984). The Board there found valid a
30-day restriction on members' resignation rights.
253. The Board found that "any restrictions placed by a union on its members' right to resign... are unlawful."
270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. 1257, 1259 (1984).
254. Id. at 1260.
255. Id.
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between permissible internal enforcement and impermissible external enforcement of
union rules, which tolerates only internal discipline of members.
256
The Supreme Court guidelines concerning the legality of internal union disci-
pline allow unions to enforce properly adopted rules reflecting legitimate union
interests, which impair no congressional labor law policy, and which are reasonably
enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the
rule. 257 Accordingly, the Court has held lawful the imposition and enforcement of
fines against union members who cross picket lines and return to work during an
authorized strike,2 5 8 and has held unlawful the imposition of fines against
strikebreaking employees who had been union members at the inception of the strike
but who resigned their membership before returning to work. 259 The cases before the
Court did not involve ostensibly binding prohibitions against resignation, and neither
the ratio decidendi of nor dicta in the decisions resolves the legal viability of any such
prohibitions.
Clear tension is present between the national labor policies preserving the effica-
cy of the strike weapon and the voluntary nature of unionism. The statutory language
appears to reflect a slight congressional preference for the latter. Thus, while the
statutory language generally guarantees noninterference with the right to strike except
as otherwise indicated in the Act, 26 the language explicitly guarantees the right to
refrain from union activity and membership. 261 The decisional language of the Court
also appears to stress the essentiality of voluntarism as a predicate for discipline.
Absent further direction from Congress or the Court in an area so charged with
implications, the Board does well to proceed with caution and maintain rather than
upset the delicate balance seemingly reached by Congress.
CONCLUSION
Former NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller has minimized the significance of
recent Board reversals, has stated that such decisions have "not effectuated any
dramatic or key changes in any long-standing central concepts," and has ascribed
criticism of Board changes to election year politics.2 62 I respectfully disagree. In my
256. Id.
257. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969). See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at
166-74; Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline after Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
187 (1969); Note, The Right to Be a Recalcitrant Union Member, 24 VAND. L. REv. 105 (1970).
258. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 191-92(1967); see Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969)
(fines lawfully imposed on union members who violated union rule prohibiting acceptance of immediate payment for
production in excess of a ceiling rate). See generally Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines: The NLRA and Union
Disciplinary Power, 17 UCLA L. REv. 681 (1970); Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National
Labor Relations Act: The Radiations ofAllis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067; Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under
§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 20 Loy. L. REv. 245 (1974).
259. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers, Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213,215 (1972); Booster Lodge No.
405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 87-88 (1973). See generally Archer, Allis-Chalmers Recycled: A Current View of a Union's
Right to Fine Employees for Crossing a Picket Line, 7 IND. L. Rav. 498 (1974); Note, Union Power to Discipline
Members Who Resign, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1536 (1973).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); see NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
261. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1982); see NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
262. Defense of NLRB's Performance, [News and Background Information] 116 LAB. REL. RE'. (BNA) 103 (June
11, 1984).
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view, politics aside, the foregoing exegesis indicates that many of the Board reversals
are of major import and profoundly alter the preexisting balance of labor management
relations. The decisions on employer neutrality, preelection propaganda, arbitral
deferral, and corporate rearrangement, for example, reflect inter alia a substantial
deregulation of employer conduct with a concomitant, potential disenfranchisement
of employee rights and interests. The decisions on individual activity and strike
misconduct, for a second example, reflect constriction of the protective ambit pre-
viously accorded employee activities. The decision on union fines reflects substantial
curtailment of union power to enforce solidarity.
One suspects the Board has only just begun.2 63 In this initial phase the Reagan
NLRB appears intent upon placing its politicized imprimatur on national labor policy
and thereby reordering a perceived imbalance. The Board might do well to heed the
Supreme Court's admonition that "the Board construes its functions too expansively
when it claims general authority to define national labor policy by balancing the
competing interests of labor and management.
' 264
263. See Regulatory Reform for NLRB Stability, [News and Background Information] 116 LAB. REL. RFP. (BNA)
68 (May 28, 1984) (Remarks of Member Zimmerman); NLRB Chairman on Pace of Decisions, [News and Background
Information] 116 LAB. RE.. REP. (BNA) 41 (May 21, 1984) (Remarks of Chairman Dotson); Case Backlog at Labor
Board, [News and Background Information] 115 LAB. Rm. RE'. (BNA) 186 (March 5, 1984) (Remarks of Chairman
Dotson); NLRB's Dotson On First Year, [News and Background Information] 115 LAB. REL. Rm'. (BNA) 163 (Feb. 27,
1984) (Remarks of Chairman Dotson); House Hearings on NLRB Case Backlog, [News and Background Information] 114
LAB. RE. RuP. (BNA) 201 (Nov. 14, 1983); see also AFL-CIO Views on NLRB Actions, [News and Background
Information] 116 LAB. RE. RE'. (BNA) 46 (May 21, 1984).
264. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965). "The deference owed to an expert tribunal
cannot be allowed to slip into ajudicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy
decisions properly made by Congress." Id. at 318.
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